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If! THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, (Sal t Lake City 
Coroorat ion), 
Plaint i f f /Respondent 
vs 
Jerry McKinley Armstrong,* 
Defendant/Appellant 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgement and convict ion for dr iv ing under the inf luence and 
dr iv ing without a d r iv ing l icense, both being misdemeanors, in v io la t i on of 
A r t i c l e 5, Const i tut ion of the State of Utah - section 41-6-44, in the f i f t h 
C i r cu i t Court in and fo r Sal t Lake C i t y , State of Utah, the Honorable Shir ley 
McCleve, Judge pres id ing. 
Jerry McKinley Armstrong 
Pro Se 
Utah State Prison # 15774 
Post Off ice Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Rodger Cutler and 
Richard G. Hamp 
Attorney fo r P l a i n t i f f 
Sal t Lake City Prosecutors 
451 South 2J0 East, #125 
Sal t Lake C i t y , Utah 34111 
Telephone: 535-7767 
F I L E D 
JANj? 1989 
Stork Suprtra* Cowl. UtiK 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this honorable Court is invoked oursuant to Amendment 
5, and 14, Constitution of the United States of America, Article 5, Section 
41-5-44, Subsection (1) and (2), Constitution of the State of Utah, Rule 2 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and farther jurisdiction is conferred 
on this Court pursuant it's own Rules, Rule 24 and 27, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals whereby a defendant in a cause may take an aooeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals from a final judqement and conviction had in a lower 
Court. 
In this case final judgement and conviction was rendered bv the 
honorable Shirley McCleve, Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake City, Utah, State of Utah (Traffic Division). 
CITED AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
'.JALLER vs FLORIDA, 3'J7 U.S 337, 25 L.ED. 2d 435, 9 S.CT. 1134, reh den 303 
U.S. 914, 26 L.ED. 279, 90 S. CT. 1634, 5 
STRICKLAND vs WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. at 563, and 637 7 
STATE vs RQ3INSQN, ("1o. Sup.) 323 S.M. 2d 557, 8 
STATE vs ST. CLAIR, (Mo. Sup.) 252 S.W. 2d 25, 27 ') 
STATUTES 
41-5-44, Constitution of the State of Utah, A 
41-6-44.10, Constitution of the State of Utah * 
SECTION 41-5-43, SU3SECTI0N (2), Constitution of the State of Utah - (driving 
wiii le intoxicated and reckless dri vinn), 3 
SECTION 41-5-44, 8.9 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE, 5 
41-6-44, SUBSECTION (1), ARTICLE 5, Constitution of the State of Utah 4 
23 USCA 2254, 6 
RULE 2, United States Code Annototed, Title 23, Judiciarv and Judicial 
Procedure, Section 2255, 6 
42 USC 416 (f)(1). Federal Social Security Act., ,-. 6 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 5 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, Constitution of the United State of America, 7 
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Rev. 313, 9 
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i l l u s t r ous Bunny Club, a dangerous s i t u ra t i on surfaced between Miss. 3ankhead 
and the other lady who appellant touqht was a f r iend of Miss. Bankhead. Thev 
s tar ted an argument that was reaching the ooint were bodylv threats were 
being tossed about. Consequently, appellant wishinq that harm towards e i the r 
of these indiv iduals manifest decided the best way to handle the nat ter would 
be to ev ic t ha l f of the argument from his automobile. So appellant stoooed 
his automobile immediately, turned on emergency f lashers that are factory 
i ns ta l l ed jus t for such emergencies, and proceeded to attempt mi t iga t ion of 
the argument that was e i the r qoing to cause damaae to appellants automobile, 
or destroy one of the ind iv iduals l i f e form. 
Such was the state of a f f a i r s confront ing appellant when patroleman 
Swin approached appellants automobile f r i s t from the f r o n t , and then from 
the rear, on 12 or 13 June 1933. 
As the arrest locat ion w i l l point out the place of arrest was on a 
res ident ia l s t r e e t , and i t w i l l also ooint out that appellant was double 
parked, with f lashers on. The appellant is a professional dr iver with over 
three-hundred thousand every type of weather and highway condit ion coast to 
coast miles dr iv ing eighteen wheels t r a c t o r s - t r a i l e r combanations, without 
experiencing any accidents whatsoever. 
When patroleman Swin stopped behind appellants automobile the appellant 
s tar ted searching fo r his automobile c e r t i f i c a t i o n documents, which he found 
on the sun v isor of the dr iver side of the automobile. Patroleman Swin then 
put his spot l i g h t in appellants mirrors and asked appellant to ex is t car, 
which appellant d i d , along wi th automobile documents.This a l l happen in the 
course of approximately one minute, or even a ha l f of a minute. Arguement 
was s t i l l ensuing i n appellants automobile. 
Upon ex is t ing his automobile the appellant immediately went back to 
patroleman Swin's pol ice cruser and asked him i f he would assist him in 
m i t iga t ing an argument that was get t inq out of hand in his automobile. Pa t ro l -
(2) 
eman Swin then asked appellant, " how much have you had to drink toniaht "? 
Appellants answer was, M not much." In the mean time while appellants back 
was turned to his automobile two or three of the peonle in the car had 
gotten out and was standing outside aooellants auto as appellant observed 
upon being escorted to the curb to begin takinq the field sobriety test. 
Appellant must point out here that officer Swin never even asked one 
single question concerning the problems I told him that I was havinq and 
such being the same reason that appellant was stoooed in an illegal oarkinq 
manner. Nor did patroleman Swin ask the young lona lady who was standing 
around after everybody else had taken flight, wheather or not mv request for 
helo was genuine, or wheather anybody was in an arguement or not. Appellant 
also would like to point out that Mr. Farmer, the individual who appellant 
brought to the bar with him, took flight alonq with Miss. Rankhead and the 
other individual, whoes name appellant does not know. 
If appellant had professionally tought the probabilitv of another 
motirist not seeing aooellants automobile parked at the exact location in 
which it was parked; so aooellant could address the arguement situration, 
outweighed the probability of someone getting hurt or killed as a results 
of the arguement going on in appellants automobile, appellant would have 
not parked in an illegal manner. However, the arguement in appellants car 
had reached very dangerous levels and appellant, thus, applied emergency 
brakes to deal with a life and death situration. 
Consequently, all the appreciation that appellant received was a 
driving under the influence without license conviction and six months in 
Utah State Prison. 
The appellant is not a patroleman by oatroleman Swinfs standards, 
neither does he characteristically profess to know the whole personalities 
of the individuals who were in his automobile that night in June. But 
appellant does know that if someone had gotten killed why patroleman Swin's 
concerns Dr io r i t ys were on giv ing appellant a f i e l d sober i ty t e s t , oatroleman 
Swin would have been grossly negeligent of his o f f i c i a l duties which he swore 
to uphold upon enter ing the law enforcement vocation. 
Before or while the appellant was takening the f i e l d soberi tv t e s t , he 
to ld patroleman Swin that he was also takeninq mental hyniene medcine, and 
appellant feel patroleman Swin had the option to e lect pursuance to sections 
41-6-44, and 41-6-44.10, A r t i c l e 5, Const i tut ion of the State of Utah, which 
chemical tes t or tes t of appellants breath, blood, or u r ine , which best sui ted 
the purpose of determining i f appellant was s t a t u t o r i l y prohib i ted from 
operating his own automobile. Appellant feels that a blood tes t ought to 
have been the fac tor which determined the combination of alcohol contents, 
aGv determinative of the drug contents present in apDelants system uoon him 
issur ing appellant an ar rest fo r d r iv ing under the in f luence. Appellant f i nd 
no fairness in the Court which allowed the admiss ib i l i t y of the breath analysis 
tes t because appellant is and was on precribed mental hygiene medication. And, 
41-6-44, s ta tes: " a peace o f f i c e r shal l determine which of the aforesaid test 
shal l be administered.'1 See a l legat ions : 3, 4 , 5, 6 , and 7, of appellants 
document - "appeal fo r d r iv ing under the inf luence convict ion" f i l e d wi th th is 
Court already. 
A r t i c l e 5, Const i tu t ion of the State of Utah, 41-6-44, subsection (1) 
s ta tes : " that i t i s unlawful and punishable i f a person have a combined 
inf luence of drugs or alcohol greater than .08% to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely d r iv ing a veh ic le , or to be in actual physical 
control of such vehicle in th i s State . " 
Appellants alcohol contents, he t h i nks , read 104%, at the issur ing of 
the dr iv ing under the inf luence ar res t . 
This sect ion states fa r the r : " upon a second convict ion w i th in f i ve 
years a f te r a f i r s t conv ic t ion , the Court sha l l impose a mandatory i a i l 
sentence of not more than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the j a i l . " The appellant admitts 
to th is Court that the culmination value of aooellants d r iv inq under the 
inf luence causes equalls two w i th in the statutory f i ve year time soan 
prescribed by State Law. 3ut fo r the sake of appellant his reasoninq uoon 
mu l t i p l i ca t i on factors deployed bv the Board of Pardons whoes common 
denominators fac t f ind inn c r i t e r i a s convenient!v allows i t to sentence 
ind i v idua ls , j us t because they are on parole, to more time than the 
State Const i tut ion requirements s t a t u t o r i l y dictates regardinn misdemeanors. 
At the conclusion of serving th is t ime, only mv second dr iv inq under the 
inf luence in f o r t y years of d r i v i n o , the appellant w i l l have served 
exactly one f u l l year in th is Prison fo r a combined to ta l of two dr iv inn 
under the inf luence convic t ions, plus meetinq the other requirements that 
the highest order of Law in th i s s t a t e , s t a t u t o r i l y reauires. Appellant has 
even stayed in the drunk tank overniaht??? 
Appellant has already addressed the fact that purviews of the1double 
jeopardy1 clause indicated that some controversy could emerqe reqardinq the 
Cons t i t u t i ona l i t y of how the ra t iona l components of th is States s tatutorv 
Laws are re f lec ted w i th in the quidel ins of Adult Probation and Parole and 
the Board of Pardons, insofar as t h e i r Drocedures and processes which 
determines a probat ioners, or oarolee, inconsequential in f rac t ions uoon 
the States s ta tu tory Rules of Law measures, comparable to measures of 
punishments prescribed fo r other Cit izens of th is State who are not c l ien ts 
of t he i r i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
What, then, your honors, constitues a true and f a i r aoorehension of 
th is State'ScLaws. I t is io i so la t i on of the Const i tut ion of the United 
States of America to discr iminate against any class or race of oeonle, or 
i nd iv idua ls . But seemingly that is precisely what the Board of Pardons does 
regarding parolee. That in no form can be considered equal! protect ion as 
the promulgators of the equal! Protect ion clause intended. 
The appellant c i tes Waller vs F lo r ida^ 397 U.S. 3S7„ 25 L. ED._2d 435, 
his already f i l e d document: motion to vacate judgement and order pursuant 
to 28 USC 2255 and 13 USC 4244. The appellant add i t iona l l y aoplys 23 USCA 
2254, and Rule 2, United State Code Annotated, T i t l e 23, Judiciary and 
Judic ia l Procedure, Section 2255. 
Considering a l l factors present and demonstrative of the events 
whoes spec i f i c f rac t ions formed the basis dif ferences which resulted in 
appellant landing in Pr ison, meaning appellants a r res t , w i th in the context 
of how the State of Utah Const i tut ion discerns on fl to a deqree which renders 
the person incapable of safely dr iv inq a veh ic le . " The appellant frame th is 
to mean in layman terms, that a person dr iv ing a vehicle under substances 
contents above the States .03% statu tory alcohol level i s not necessari ly 
•incapable of safely driving1 , but i f he has establ ished a dr iv inq oatterninq 
of reckleness whereby that persons automobile is beinq controled by influences 
other than that persons normal s e l f , then, that person is in v i o la t i on of the 
dr iv ing under the inf luence s ta tu tory laws of the State of Utah. 
The elements of appellants act ions, nor the elements of appellants 
i n ten t ions , are determining factors which would have lead a prudent person 
to believe that the appellant was, c i t i n g instant of a r res t , ' incapable of 
safely d r i v ing 1 his automobile.Because appellant was not d r iv inq when p a t r o l -
eman Swin approached his automobile. This impass, consequently, reqardinq how 
patroleman Swin reached his conclusions about appellants i n a b i l i t y to operate 
his automobile, confounds appellants fa r beyound his comprehension of what 
the promulgators of the words arranqement ' incapable of safely dr iv inq a 
v e h i c l e ' , ' t o a degree' , had in mind regarding formulat ion of statues which 
would allow the States law enforcement arm the opportunity to apprehend the 
incapable and unsafe d r i ve r . 
The Federal Social Security Act , 42 USC $ 416 ( i ) ( l ) , now defines 
" d i s a b i l i t y " as (A) " i n a b i l i t y to engaqe in any substant ia l qain^ul a c t i v i t y 
by reason of any medically determinable phvsical or mental imoairement which 
can be expected to resu l t in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 Months: or (B) blindness". 
Appellant hereof contends that the Court of the trial instant ounht 
to have ordered a hearing determinative to the mental sufficiencv of 
appellant to grasp the handle of the intricate trial instant. Suanestive 
to corresnondinq issues as to wheather aonellant should have been confined 
to a hospital or orison envioronment. An individual who is functional in 
a hospital setting, may not be functional in a orison setting. 
The appellant knows that he has already mention the fact that he 
frames the rules of law that he has read as creatinq controversv revolvinq 
the elements of this cause interdependent with freedom of speech, and due 
process of law, pursuance to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States of America. Analyzinq this imoass farther the 
appellant must compare the efforts of his court appointed counsel to that 
of efforts of one receivinq compensation for collective barqaininn an 
individuals life away. In the instant of trial where the aonellant asked 
his counsel of records to suboeona all of the individuals ridinq*tn:,IHs 
automobile the night of instant of arrest, counsel told aonellant that 
what they would have to say in trial, would be'irrelevant* to aooellants 
inquiry. Appellant, thus, states that his counsels conduct was unsatis-
factory, and harbored controversy in liqht of undermininq the orooer 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial manifestations are 
not reliable as having produced fair and just results. Aonellant, therefore, 
cites: Strickland vs Washington, 466 U. S. at 638, and 687. 
It must be mention to this court that Miss. Bankhead was too a client 
of the Adult Probation and Parole Departments, Utah Department of Corrections, 
Intensive Supervision Program. Appellant has discovered this fact since he 
landed in Prison. 
Appellant would also like to inform this court at this time that his 
automobile had commercial license plates. A type of plate which allows the 
vehicle to park in a yellow curb, and to stop .anywhere with prooer signals. 
Therefore, inasmuch as anpellant harboring tounhts that his 1 avians 
conception about the rationale and interpretations of the various rules, cases, 
and statutes cited herewithin, and hopefully conveved in linht of this Court 
finding different determinative factors which mav nromote appellants quest for 
properly framed and reasonable justice; he shall respectfully attempt to bring 
this retaliatory to a conclusion through farther conveying his lavmans side 
of this coin as to wheather or not genuine probable cause coniunctive with 
illegal search and seizure raises sensational controversy renardinn the instant 
of arrest. 
According to the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 5 - Drivinn 
While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, section 41-6-43, subsection (2); orobabl< 
cause, in the instant of a patroling patroleman detainina an individual supected 
of driving under the influence, exists when: " an ordiance adopted by a local 
authority that governs reckless driving, or driving a vehicle in willful or wanto 
disregard for the safety of persons or orooertv shall be consistent with the 
provisions of this code which govern those matters." (found in Utah Code 1934-35, 
volume 2, Title 30-55). 
Consequently, since appellant has already stated to this Court, purviews of 
section 41-6-44, which lays down the law of the Utah land reqardino where and 
how an individual constitutes tremor upon this section of Utah law in regard to 
driving an automobile under the influence of substance, the issue remainina 
which need conveying to this Court reflects that nonewhatsoever probable cause 
was present at instant of arrest, and instant of encounter, which statutorly 
required patroleman Swin to request appellant yield to a driving under the 
influence field sobriety test. 
It is a fundamental legal principle that criminal punishment should not be 
visited upon the blameless. An illustration of this principle was affirmed in, 
State vs Robinson,(MotSup.) 328 S. W. 2d 667, " If a person commits an act 
under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed to him since, in 
effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to the act." 
Citing, Newman and Weitzer, Duress, Free ''/ill and the Criminal Law, 33 So. 
Cal. L. Rev, 313. 
And as aooellant has stated to this Court he only was attemDtinq to 
bestow some kindness upon a fellow human beings when dissent emerged within 
appellants automobile and confronted him with a horrific dilemma between 
his passengers. The evidence established at apoellants trial assaults anv 
other belief or circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to think 
that the appellant did not act with regards reflective of compulsion. 
Thus, affirming the fact that the appellant established no conditions 
which statutorly can be construed as recklessness or negligent under section 
41-5-44, justification from aooellants 'horrific dilemma1 compels him to 
hitch his defense to coercion pursurance to State vs St. Clair, (Mo. Sup.) 
2G2 S. W. 2d 25, 27 based upon the following brief arguement, 
" a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the averaqe 
member of the community would be too severe for that community to bear." 
And appellant hereof respectfully rest the foregoing issues conveyed 
in this laymans arguement. 
Dated this Day of October, 1938. 
cc: ROGER CUTLER and By: 
RICHARD G. HAT1P JERRY riCKiriLEY^ARMSTRONG 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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State of Utah, (Salt Lake City 
Corporation), 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Jerry M. Armstrong, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF 
SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880489-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings and Davidson (On Law and 
Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals his convictions of drunk driving and 
driving without a valid driver's licence. He was arrested in 
the early morning hours of June 12, 1988 after he admitted that 
he had been drinking and was unable to produce a valid driver's 
license. His intoxilyzer test results indicated a blood 
alcohol content of .14. 
On appeal defendant argues that he was entitled to have a 
physician present at the time the blood alcohol breath test was 
administered. He also alleges the existence of a conspiracy 
among officers and others to have him arrested because the 
police officers failed to answer his request for help to 
resolve an argument between his passengers. Respondent Salt 
Lake City has moved for summary affirmance of defendant's 
convictions. Defendant has filed a response to the motion and 
his appellant's brief herein. 
After considering the record on appeal and the authorities 
argued by defendant, we grant respondent's motion for summary 
affirmance because: 
1) Many of the arguments by defendant on appeal were 
not presented to the trial court and will not be considered 
for the first time by this court. Lane v. Messes 731 P.2d 
488 (Utah 1986) . 
2) Defendant's argument that by parking illegally he 
was attempting to invoke the assistance of the police to 
resolve a dispute among defendant's passengers does not in 
any way excuse defendant's conduct of driving while 
intoxicated or without a valid driver's license. 
3) The representation of defendant by counsel was not 
inadequate under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
4) The remaining arguments raised by appellant in his 
brief require no discussion as they are wholly lacking in 
merit. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary disposition is granted and 
defendant's convictions are summarily affirmed. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood,1Judge "v 
"^} r s e • ?*h ^UCiif^il 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Ri 
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